Introduction
Policy makers have long recognized the potential for information technology (IT) to contribute to economic growth and development. For example, investments in IT that lead to higher factor productivity and increased competitiveness can have a direct impact on economic growth (Kraemer and Dedrick 1994) . This relationship, researchers argue, underlines the key role that IT has played in the development of Southeast Asia's newly industrialized economies (NIEs) (Mody and Dahlman 1992; Rahim and Pennings 1987) . Specifically, as the NIEs' share of global IT production 1 increased from 6.3% in 1985 to 17.7% in 1994 -denoting a six-fold increase in output -annual GDP grew by an average of 16.7% (OECD 1997) 2 . Consequently, IT production is seen as a high-growth sector with enormous potential for employment creation and economic growth (Dedrick and Kraemer 1995) .
Although many countries continue to focus on IT production, there is a belief among scholars in IT-led development that countries might be better served by policies that promote IT use. This argument is based on the notion that payoffs from widespread use of IT permeate many sectors of the economy whereas payoffs from IT production can be confined to the computer sector alone. In addition, an emphasis on IT use might be more "cost-effective", considering that for many developing countries, the cost of creating a viable global presence in IT production can be prohibitive considering the high-priced incentives that many countries now offer to foreign multinationals. One way that countries have tried to promote greater use of IT is through national IT plans. For example, Malaysia's "2020 Vision" campaign and Singapore's "IT 2000" plan represent deliberate attempts to increase government and corporate use of IT, besides stimulating public interest in IT. National governments have also overseen the creation of science and technology parks, such as the Kulim High-Technology Industrial Park in Malaysia and the 1 In 1994, the worldwide market for IT production (referring to the production of computer hardware and telecommunications equipment) was valued at $711.3 billion, representing an annual average increase of 8. 7% since 1985 7% since (OECD 1997 . 2 In contrast, during the same period, average annual U.S. production of IT increased by a mere 3.3%, while annual GDP growth averaged 5.9% (OECD 1997).
-2 -Hsinchu Industry and Science Park in Taiwan, as incubation sites for highly innovative, technologyintensive companies. Behind such plans is a belief that increased levels of IT diffusion and use provide opportunities for economic growth. While the effectiveness of such policies is debatable (Kraemer, Gurbaxani and King 1992) , rising levels of IT spending within countries suggest that the potential contribution of IT use to economic growth and development cannot be overlooked.
3 While Asia's tiger economies have traditionally been promoted as models for economic growth, Ireland's recent economic performance has attracted considerable attention, earning it the label, Europe's Celtic Tiger. By all accounts, Ireland's economic performance has been remarkable -as the fastest growing economy in the OECD, real GDP growth has exceeded 7% each year since 1993, unemployment has fallen from 16% to 7% in just under five years, inflation has stabilized below 2% while productivity levels are among the highest in Europe. Indeed, as shown in Figure 1 , Ireland's recent economic performance has surpassed that of Asia's tigers and the world's leading industrialized nations. As a small open economy of 3.5 million people, the reasons behind Ireland's economic success are worthy of note, particularly as annual GNP 4 growth is expected to remain at 5% until 2005 (ESRI 1997).
Insert Figure 1 about here
While there are several plausible explanations for Ireland's success, the role played by IT is especially important. Through a policy of "industrialization by invitation", Ireland has become one of the world's leading producers of computer hardware and software. Yet, with this success has come a sense of vulnerability and foreboding as policy makers question whether Ireland's continuing focus on IT production can provide sustainable economic growth. In this paper, we follow the development of Ireland's IT industries, focusing on the economic payoffs Ireland has received and the steps it has taken to 3 In 1995, the worldwide market for IT, which includes spending on PCs, workstations, servers, data communications equipment, packaged software and services, was estimated at $527.6 billion (OECD 1997). 4 The difference between gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national product (GNP) is explained by "net factor flows". Though this distinction is rarely important, in the Irish context, massive financial outflows in the form of repatriated profits by foreign-owned enterprises make GNP a more realistic measure of growth. For example, in 1997, net factor flows amounted to IR£5.6 billion, or 12.2% of GDP totaling IR£45.9 billion.
-3 -avoid problems associated with being a low-cost producer of IT. Although Ireland is clearly a developed country, its approach to IT-led development and its efforts to achieve sustainable economic growth provide valuable lessons for developing countries seeking to join the global IT production bandwagon.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce a theoretical framework of IT-led development. We then apply this framework to develop insights into how Ireland, despite having a weak indigenous industrial base, succeeded in developing a world-class IT industry in hardware, software and services. Finally we abstract from Ireland's experience to provide general insights into how developing countries can use IT to achieve economic growth and development
Research Framework
Several studies provide empirical evidence that IT investment contributes to industrial and economic output (De Long and Summers 1991; Dewan and Kraemer 1998; Oliner and Sichel 1994) . For example, in an econometric study of 36 countries on data from 1985 to 1993, Dewan and Kraemer (1998) found evidence of positive and significant returns to IT capital, 5 but only for developed countries. In contrast, for less developed countries, they found evidence of positive and significant returns to non-IT capital. In their conclusion, they argue that "perhaps a substantive base of capital stock and infrastructure is [required] for IT investments to be productive" (p. 4). Since developed countries have an alreadyestablished infrastructure with significant investments in both capital equipment and education, they are arguably in a better position to leverage their IT investments to produce greater economic payoffs.
However, without a critical mass of resources, both in terms of technological infrastructure and human capabilities, less developed countries face steep barriers to technology payoff.
In a separate study of IT production and use in East Asia, Dedrick and Kraemer (1998) Krugman (1994) argues that the sheer level of private investment in Asia's tiger economies is a key explanation for their economic success. Others are less sanguine with this explanation and point to the critical role of government in creating human capital, infrastructure and providing incentives for private investment (Wade 1990; World Bank 1993 
Environmental Factors
When Ireland achieved independence from the United Kingdom in 1922, it had virtually no industrial base. Ireland's economic fortunes were closely tied to agriculture, which employed over 50% of the labor force. Agriculture was deemed of such importance to the economy that the first Minister for Agriculture declared that the primary aim of Ireland's economic policy should be to maximize farmers'
earnings, and that this should take precedence over programs aimed at achieving self-sufficiency and reducing unemployment (Kennedy, Giblin and McHugh 1989) .
Ireland operated a free-trade policy until 1932, when in an attempt to increase employment and reduce emigration, it reverted to protectionism. Unlike the selective protectionist policies favored in Japan and South Korea, Ireland's protectionist policies were indiscriminately applied across all sectors of the economy. These policies were only partially successful, for while protectionism favored firms in technically mature industries with low barriers to entry, it excluded Ireland from participation in more technology-intensive industries (O'Malley 1989). Protectionism failed to nurture an export capability among Ireland's indigenous industries while it also allowed inefficiencies in production to go unchecked.
As a result, when tariffs and quotas were finally dismantled in the early 1960s, the false sense of security engendered by protectionism gave way to increased emigration 6 and unemployment. This failure revealed the deep-rooted problems facing indigenous firms while it simultaneously suggested a need to resort to -6 -overseas investment. Besides creating employment opportunities, overseas investment was seen as a way for Ireland to acquire industrial expertise and capabilities that indigenous firms were unable to provide.
Industrial Policy
By the early 1960s, protectionism had been dismantled and replaced with a policy of "industrialization by invitation". This policy focused on attracting overseas investment through a system of financial and tax-based incentives. For example, non-repayable grants were provided to cover the cost of land and buildings, while in an attempt to boost exports and to create an indigenous export capability, profits from export sales were declared exempt from corporation tax.
These incentives, coupled with the availability of low cost labor, were key factors behind the first wave of foreign investment into Ireland. These incentives became even more important when Ireland joined the European Community in 1973 (later to become the European Union), transforming Ireland into a low-cost manufacturing base for firms wishing to enter the European market. In 1980, the introduction of a 10% corporation tax on manufacturing profits, 7 reinforced Ireland's attractiveness as a location for overseas investment. Finally, to secure the profits of foreign-owned firms against additional taxes when profits were repatriated, double tax agreements were negotiated with foreign governments.
Besides the availability of grants and the favorable tax treatment of manufacturing profits, the presence of a large young, educated and computer-literate workforce was another key factor in firms'
decisions to locate in Ireland during the 1980s. Recognizing that a large influx of overseas firms (principally in IT production) would require a significant number of skilled workers, third level educational institutions placed an increased emphasis on engineering, computer science and other technical degrees during the 1980s. As far back as the late 1960s, a system of regional technical colleges had been established to provide apprentice and technician training in several electronics and engineering fields. As Ireland's IT industries became more prominent, many of the courses provided by these -7 -colleges, and to a lesser extent Ireland's mainstream universities, were tailored to the needs of the IT industry. Indeed, Irela nd's educational system has been so successful at adapting to the needs of its industrial sector that Ireland is now ranked as having the second best educational system in the world in terms of responsiveness to the needs of a competitive economy (IMD 1997) . Language courses were also provided, helping to ensure a multilingual graduate population. 8 Consequently, by the early 1980s, a large pool of educated, technically proficient university graduates was available to satisfy the growing needs of the computer industry. Entering firms were also able to tap into a growing body of skilled workers already employed by overseas firms engaged in the manufacture of IT hardware.
Between 1949 and 1994, the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) -an independent agency of the Irish government -was responsible for Ireland's industrial planning and policy determination.
Critics would later claim that by focusing on overseas investment, the success of Ireland's industrial policy was being achieved at the expense of its indigenous industries. In an attempt to address this issue, 
Building an IT Industry
By the early 1970s, Ireland's policy of "industrialization by invitation" was being used to selectively target overseas investment from multinational corporations (MNCs) in the high growth computers and electronics sector. In the sense that this policy focused on "picking winners", policy makers identified specific firms with emerging technologies and world-class manufacturing practices. In many ways, the creation of Ireland's IT industry can be traced to this point.
In 1971, Digital Equipment Corporation became the first company to establish a mini-computer manufacturing facility in Ireland. Other computer manufacturers that followed include Amdahl (1978) , Apple (1980) and Wang (1980) . However, the operations that these and other MNCs established and operated during the 1970s were, with few exceptions, little more than sub-assembly operations. Basic components or partially completed units were imported into Ireland for final or partial assembly. The end product was then exported from Ireland for further assembly elsewhere or was packaged and shipped to distributors in overseas markets. O'Malley (1989) acknowledges that Ireland was particularly suited to this type of activity, noting that as products approach maturity, pricing becomes an important competitive issue. Helleiner (1990) expands upon this noting that proximity to final markets and special concessions such as financial and tax-based incentives are important factors in selecting a location for export-oriented activities. Consequently, transferring production of labor-intensive manufacturing activities to less developed countries to take advantage of lower labor costs can provide an important cost advantage.
Yet, despite the availability of financial incentives, several foreign enterprises closed their Irish operations as soon as their grant allocation had expired. Fearing that the IDA's policy of "industrialization by invitation" was faltering, the National Economic and Social Council (an economic advisory board to the Irish government) invited the U.S. Telesis Consulting Group led by Ira Magaziner to undertake an independent assessment of Ireland's industrial strategy. The Telesis report that emerged from this study -9 -noted that "foreign-owned industrial operations in Ireland with few exceptions do not embody the key competitive activities of the businesses in which they participate; do not employ significant numbers of skilled workers; and are not significantly integrated into traded and skilled sub-supply industries in
Ireland" (NESC 1992, p. 24) . Telesis noted that MNCs were not necessarily at fault for failing to establish local sub-supply linkages. Rather, the MNCs had no choice but to source supplies from overseas since indigenous Irish suppliers (if they even existed) lacked essential technical and managerial expertise.
Ireland's indigenous suppliers were also less capital intensive than their overseas competitors.
Consequently, when operating with low capacity levels, Irish suppliers were unable to realize sufficient economies of scale to enable them to maintain cost competitiveness with overseas suppliers. In light of these issues, it would seem unlikely that Ireland's indigenous IT sector could have matured into a viable IT industry without the involvement of overseas firms. Although reliance on MNCs might be considered a risky strategy for industrial development in any economy, in Ireland's case, there was no alternative.
While computer hardware producers dominated the first phase of overseas investment during the 1970s, a second phase of overseas investment in software and services began to emerge during the 1980s (Sweeney 1998 Ireland was chosen because of its "location as a member of the European Union, the quality of the infrastructure -roads, airports, water -the overall balance of costs, the financial incentives offered by the Irish authorities and . . . the quality and numbers of highly qualified people coming out of the educational -10 -system" (Intel 1998 ). Since 1990, Intel has invested over $2.5 billion in developing its Irish operation, making it the most significant overseas firm in Ireland.
High-tech firms, such as Intel, are increasingly attracted by the high rates of return earned by foreign-owned firms operating in Ireland. As shown in Figure 4 , between 1994 and 1997, U.S. computer hardware producers in Ireland enjoyed a return on investment that was on average four times higher than elsewhere in the E.U. (BEA 1998 
Insert Figure 5 about here
Exports of hardware and software are key to the success of Ireland's IT industries. In 1995, exports accounted for 97.6% of hardware production and 93.8% of software production (CSO 1998b). As shown in Figure 5 , hardware and software exports currently account for one-fifth of Ireland's total exports, indicating the importance of IT exports to the overall economy. Ireland also boasts the fastest growth rates in computer hardware exports among the top producing nations (ITC 1998). Consistent with this increased emphasis on IT exports, there has been an increase in employment in these industries. For example, from 1991 to 1996, employment i n hardware production increased from 7,400 to 15,200 (CSO 1998a) while employment in software production grew from 7,800 to 18,300 (NSD 1998).
Ireland's ability to leverage its pool of multilingual graduates has made it an ideal site for software localization by international software firms. 
Industry Structure
Overseas firms dominate the Irish computer hardware industry. As shown in Table 2 , in 1996, overseas firms accounted for 97% of industry revenues and 87% of industry employment. In terms of firm size, indigenous Irish firms tend to be small, with on average of 56 employees, compared with an industry average of 220 employees. Meanwhile, U.S. firms constitute the largest body of computer hardware producers in Ireland, with an average firm size of just under 500 employees. These statistics suggest that Irish firms face stiff competition from MNCs, particularly in mass markets where economies of scale help to reduce production costs and improve overall competitiveness. This also helps to explains why Irish producers are more likely to operate in niche areas which are traditionally less attractive to MNCs.
Insert Table 2 about here
From an economic perspective, the disparity between the performance of Irish and overseas firms highlights a serious problem facing Ireland's indigenous firms in terms of their ability to compete in a 9 During the 1980s, Telecom Éireann invested $5 billion to develop a fully integrated digital telecommunications infrastructure. Over 80% of telephone users are now connected through digital lines (Telecom Éireann 1996) . 10 In an effort to prevent the peripheral states from being marginalized by the more prosperous states, in 1993, the E.U. made available structural and cohesion funds to the "poorer" member states in the E.U. (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). Ireland's share of these funds is expected to total IR£6 billion over a ten-year period from 1989 to 1999, the highest per capita of all recipient nations.
-13 -global IT market. The Economist (1997) referred to this dual structure as "a tale of two economies: a still backward, unproductive and labor-intensive one owned by the Irish, and a modern, exceptionally productive and capital-intensive one owned by foreigners" (p. 22).
Insert Figure 6 about here
As shown in Figure 6 , productivity comparisons between indigenous and foreign firms indicate the true extent of this disparity, with productivity in overseas firms dwarfing that of indigenous firms.
Although critics claim that these data provide an unfair comparison -the productivity of overseas firms in
Ireland is inflated since employees outside Ireland are not taken into account -significant differences still remain. While transfer pricing by MNCs might explain some of this productivity gap, it nevertheless suggests that Ireland's indigenous firms lack the necessary managerial and technical skills to match the productivity levels exhibited by their overseas counterparts. Consequently, critics claim that while
Ireland's industrial policy has been successful at attracting overseas investment, Ireland's indigenous IT industries remain marginalized and underdeveloped. of adults use a PC which suggests that, at least in the short term, electronic commerce in Ireland will likely be restricted to business-to-business rather than business-to-consumer.
IT Use
-14 -As shown in Table 3 , IT spending in developing countries was less than 1% of GDP during the period 1992 to 1997. In contrast, the more industrialized nations spent 2.6% of GDP on IT, while Ireland spent a mere 1.6% of GDP, reflecting lower levels of IT use among indigenous Irish firms. Lower levels of IT spending are unlikely to produce a critical mass of investment in IT infrastructure, with the result that Ireland and other developing countries are unlikely to derive significant benefit from IT use in the short term. Consequently, there is still a significant emphasis on building up IT infrastructure in these countries rather than trying to leverage that investment through greater IT use. For example, 70% of IT spending in developing countries goes towards computer hardware, compared with 43% in the more industrialized nations. Further evidence of this is given by the fact that spending on software and services in developing countries is 7% and 18% lower, respectively, than in G7 countries. An analysis of IT spending in Ireland also reflects a significant emphasis on hardware, though not to the same extent as in developing countries. Consequently, while Irish firms continue to invest in critical IT infrastructure, IT use is likely to remain low.
Insert Table 3 Yet if this potential is to be realized, Irish policy makers must convince both indigenous firms and consumers that the Internet represents a secure and viable medium for business. As part of this effort, a number of low-population towns (less than 50,000 population) have been selected as sites for emerging technologies from smart cards to new home-based technologies. Efforts are also underway to try to increase Internet use among small and medium size enterprises (Irish Times, February 19, 1999) . 
Lessons for Developing Countries

Strategies for Sustained Economic Growth
If cost-competitiveness in IT production is unlikely to provide sustainable benefits, what then should developing countries do to achieve sustainable economic growth? While developing countries will likely be attracted by the benefits Ireland has gained through its focus on IT production, researchers indicate that IT use is more likely to provide sustainable economic growth (Dedrick and Kraemer 1998 ).
However, a lack of critical IT infrastructure and human capabilities in developing countries can restrict IT use and, therefore, hinder the realization of payoffs from IT investment (Dewan and Kraemer 1998 If developing economies cannot provide sufficient incentives to support IT production, or if reduced levels of IT spending restrict IT use in the short term, an interim solution might be to move in the direction of "production close to use", as represented by the provision of information services. Despite low levels of IT use, Ireland is particularly adept at offering professional services in areas such as -18 -outsourcing, network management, custom programming, software localization, call center operations, systems integration and web development services. While these services are still dependent on MNCs, they nevertheless allow Ireland to develop competencies in international IT services which will ultimately generate economic benefits independent of IT production. In addition, production close to use can act as a catalyst for greater use of IT throughout the economy by introducing IT services into government, businesses and education, creating a virtuous cycle of diffusion and learning.
Finally, Ireland illustrates that success in IT production does not automatically lead to high levels of IT use, as the majority of Ireland's indigenous firms have remained isolated from the MNCs that are responsible for Ireland's economic success. Therefore, while a focus on MNCs might lead to the creation of an IT industry, there is still a need for an IT policy to promote internal growth through IT use and production close to use.
Conclusion
Ireland's experience with IT-led development parallels that of many developing nations. When
Ireland's indigenous industries failed to provide adequate employment opportunities during the 1960s, Ireland pursued a policy of "industrialization by invitation" with the aim of encouraging MNCs to invest in Ireland. From the 1970s onwards, this policy was used to target individual firms in the high-tech computer sector. This emphasis on "picking winners" has allowed Ireland to attract many of the world's leading IT companies. In the belief that what was good for overseas investment was good for Ireland, the Irish government has consistently implemented policies that support this factor-based model. In addition,
Ireland supported its industrial policy with a variety of financial and tax-based incentives. Ireland's education policy was also directed towards the creation of a multilingual workforce with technical expertise in areas that would appeal to overseas firms. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Ireland Asian Tigers G7 Nations 
